Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifth-most-populous country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in Latin America. Brazil’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic performance and political instability. After a period of strong economic growth and increased international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has struggled with a series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). They also discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in October 2018.

Since taking office in January 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro has begun to implement economic and regulatory reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed hard-line security policies intended to reduce crime and violence. Rather than building a broad-based coalition to advance his agenda, however, Bolsonaro has sought to keep the electorate polarized and his political base mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and verbally attacking perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of government. This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential allies within the conservative-leaning congress and hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious challenges, such as the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and accelerating deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It also has placed additional stress on the country’s already strained democratic institutions. With the novel coronavirus spreading rapidly throughout the country and the economy projected to contract 9.1% in 2020, Brazilians have taken to the streets both in opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a poll conducted in late June 2020, 32% of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23% consider it “average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”

In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has moved away from Brazil’s traditional commitment to autonomy and toward alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro has coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional challenges such as the crisis in Venezuela. On other matters, such as commercial ties with China, Bolsonaro has adopted a pragmatic approach intended to ensure continued access to Brazil’s major export markets. The Trump Administration has welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-Brazilian relations. In 2019, the Trump Administration took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil a major non-NATO ally. The United States and Brazil also agreed to several measures intended to facilitate trade and investment. Nevertheless, some Brazilian analysts and former officials have questioned whether alignment with the United States is the most effective way to advance Brazil’s national interests.

The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian relations. Environmental conservation has been a major focus, with Congress appropriating $15 million for foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 million to address fires in the region, in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94). Likewise, Members introduced legislative proposals that would express support for Amazon conservation efforts (S.Res. 337) and restrict U.S. defense and trade relations with Brazil in response to deforestation (H.R. 4263). Congress also has expressed concerns about the state of democracy and human rights in Brazil. A provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020 (P.L. 116-92) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding Brazil’s human rights climate and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. Another resolution (H.Res. 594) would express concerns about threats to human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and the environment in Brazil.
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Introduction

As the fifth-largest country and the ninth-largest economy in the world, Brazil plays an important role in global governance (see Figure 1 for a map of Brazil). Over the past 20 years, Brazil has forged coalitions with other large, developing countries to push for changes to multilateral institutions and to ensure that global agreements on issues ranging from trade to climate change adequately protect their interests. Brazil also has taken on a greater role in promoting peace and stability, contributing to U.N. peacekeeping missions and mediating conflicts in South America and further afield. Although recent domestic challenges have led Brazil to turn inward and weakened its appeal globally, the country continues to exert considerable influence on international policy issues that affect the United States.

U.S. policymakers have often viewed Brazil as a natural partner in regional and global affairs, given its status as a fellow multicultural democracy. Repeated efforts to forge a close partnership have left both countries frustrated, however, as their occasionally divergent interests and policy approaches have inhibited cooperation. The Trump Administration has viewed the 2018 election of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro as a fresh opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship. Bolsonaro has begun to shift Brazil’s foreign policy to bring the country into closer alignment with the United States, and President Trump has designated Brazil a major non-NATO ally. Nevertheless, ongoing differences over trade protections and relations with China threaten to leave both the United States and Brazil with unmet expectations once again.

The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil, recognizing Brazil’s potential to affect U.S. initiatives and interests. Some Members view Brazil as a strategic partner for addressing regional and global challenges. They have urged the Trump Administration to forge stronger economic, security, and military ties with Brazil to bolster the bilateral relationship and counter the influence of extra-hemispheric powers, such as China and Russia. Other Members have expressed reservations about a close partnership with the Bolsonaro Administration. They are concerned that Bolsonaro is presiding over an erosion of democracy and human rights in Brazil and that his environmental policies threaten the Amazon and global efforts to mitigate...
climate change.\textsuperscript{2} Congress may continue to assess these differing approaches to U.S.-Brazilian relations as it carries out its oversight responsibilities and considers FY2021 appropriations and other legislative initiatives.

\textbf{Figure 1. Map of Brazil}

![Map of Brazil](image_url)  
\textbf{Source:} Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics.

Brazil’s Political and Economic Environment

Background

Brazil declared independence from Portugal in 1822, initially establishing a constitutional monarchy and retaining a slave-based, plantation economy. Although the country abolished slavery in 1888 and became a republic in 1889, economic and political power remained concentrated in the hands of large rural landowners and the vast majority of Brazilians remained outside the political system. The authoritarian government of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) began the incorporation of the working classes but exerted strict control over labor as part of its broader push to centralize power in the federal government. Vargas also began to implement a state-led development model, which endured for much of the 20th century as successive governments supported the expansion of Brazilian industry.

Brazil experienced two decades of multiparty democracy from 1945 to 1964 but struggled with political and economic instability, which ultimately led the military to seize power. A 1964 military coup, encouraged and welcomed by the United States, ushered in two decades of authoritarian rule. Although repressive, the military government was not as brutal as the dictatorships established in several other South American nations. It nominally allowed the judiciary and congress to function during its tenure but stifled representative democracy and civic action, carefully preserving its influence during one of the most protracted transitions to democracy to occur in Latin America. Brazilian security forces killed at least 434 dissidents during the dictatorship and they detained and tortured an estimated 30,000-50,000 others.

Brazil restored civilian rule in 1985, and a national constituent assembly, elected in 1986, promulgated a new constitution in 1988. The constitution established a liberal democracy with a strong president, a bicameral congress consisting of the 513-member chamber of deputies and the 81-member senate, and an independent judiciary. Power is somewhat decentralized under the country’s federal structure, which includes 26 states, a federal district, and some 5,570 municipalities.

Brazil experienced economic recession and political uncertainty during the first decade after its political transition. Numerous efforts to control runaway inflation failed, and two elected presidents did not complete their terms; one died before taking office, and the other was impeached on corruption charges and resigned.

The situation began to stabilize under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) of the center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, or PSDB). Initially elected on the success of the anti-inflation Real Plan that he implemented as finance minister under President Itamar Franco (1992-1994), Cardoso ushered in a series of market-oriented economic reforms. His administration privatized some state-owned enterprises, gradually opened the economy to foreign trade and investment, and adopted the three main pillars of Brazil’s macroeconomic policy: a floating exchange rate, a primary budget surplus, and an

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4 At least 8,350 indigenous Brazilians also were killed during the dictatorship, either directly by government agents or indirectly as a result of government policies. Ministério Público Federal, Procuradoria Federal dos Direitos do Cidadão, “PFDC Contesta Recomendação de Festejos ao Golpe de 64,” press release, March 26, 2019; and Relatório da Comissão Nacional da Verdade, December 10, 2014, at http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.
inflation-targeting monetary policy. Nevertheless, the Brazilian state maintained an influential role in the economy.

The Cardoso Administration’s economic reforms and a surge in international demand (particularly from China) for Brazilian commodities—such as oil, iron, and soybeans—fostered a period of strong economic growth in Brazil during the first decade of the 21st century. The center-left Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula, 2003-2010) used increased export revenues to improve social inclusion and reduce inequality. Among other measures, the PT-led government expanded social welfare programs and raised the minimum wage by 64% above inflation. Between 2003 and 2010, the Brazilian economy expanded by an average of 4.1% per year and the poverty rate fell from 28.2% to 13.6%. The growth of the middle class fueled a domestic consumption boom that reinforced Brazil’s economic expansion. Although the poverty rate initially continued to decline under the PT-led administration of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)—reaching a low of 8.4% in 2014—socioeconomic conditions deteriorated during Rousseff’s final two years in office.


After nearly two decades of relative stability, Brazil has struggled with a series of crises since 2014. The country fell into a deep recession in late 2014, due to a decline in global commodity prices and the Rousseff Administration’s economic mismanagement. Brazil’s real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 8.2% over the course of 2015 and 2016. Although Brazil emerged from recession in mid-2017, recovery has been slow. The economy expanded by just over 1% in 2017 and 2018, and unemployment, which peaked at 13.7% in the first quarter of 2017, has remained above 11% for four years. Largely due to the weak labor market, the real incomes of the bottom half of Brazilian workers declined by 17% between the onset of the recession and mid-2019, pushing an estimated 6 million people into poverty. The downturn disproportionately affected Afro-Brazilians, who comprised an estimated 56% of the Brazilian population but 64% of the unemployed in 2018. Large fiscal deficits at all levels of government exacerbated the situation, limiting the resources available to provide social services.

The deep recession also hindered federal, state, and local government efforts to address serious challenges such as crime and violence. A record-high 64,000 Brazilians were killed in 2017, and

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6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database October 2019, October 11, 2019. The poverty line is defined as the income necessary to cover basic expenses, such as food, clothing, housing, and transit. Marcelo Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais, August 2019, p. 15. Hereinafter, Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade.

7 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade.


9 IMF, Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, June 20, 2018.


11 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, pp. 5, 15.

12 In 2018, 46.5% of Brazilians self-identified as mixed race and 9.3% self-identified as black. IBGE, Desigualdades Sociais por Cor ou Raça no Brasil, 2019, p. 2.
the country’s homicide rate of 30.9 per 100,000 residents was more than five times the global average. Although homicides declined by nearly 11% in 2018, feminicide (gender-motivated murders of women) and reports of sexual violence increased.13 The deterioration in the security situation, like the economic crisis, disproportionately affected Afro-Brazilians, who were the victims of more than 75% of homicides and 61% of feminicides in 2017 and 2018.14

A series of corruption scandals further discredited the country’s political establishment. The so-called Car Wash (Lava Jato) investigation, launched in 2014, implicated politicians from across the political spectrum and many prominent business executives. The initial investigation revealed that political appointees at the state-controlled oil company, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), colluded with construction firms to fix contract bidding processes. The firms then provided kickbacks to Petrobras officials and politicians in the ruling coalition. Parallel investigations discovered similar practices throughout the public sector, with businesses providing bribes and illegal campaign donations in exchange for contracts or other favorable government treatment. The scandals sapped President Rousseff’s political support, contributing to her controversial impeachment and removal from office in August 2016.15 Michael Temer, who presided over a center-right government for the remainder of Rousseff’s term (2016-2018), was entangled in several corruption scandals but managed to hold on to power. Several other high-level politicians, including former President Lula, have been convicted for corruption and face potentially lengthy prison sentences (see the text box, below).

**Lula’s Imprisonment and Release**

Brazilian prosecutors have brought charges against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula; 2003-2010) in at least eight corruption cases, including two cases for which he has already been convicted. The first conviction was upheld by a circuit court panel and Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice, which resulted in Lula being imprisoned and barred from running for a third presidential term in 2018. Press reports have raised concerns, however, that Judge Sérgio Moro and the prosecutors initially involved in Lula’s case may have been politically biased and engaged in improper coordination; Moro served as President Jair Bolsonaro’s minister of justice and public security from January 2019-April 2020. Lula was released from prison in November 2019 after Brazil’s supreme court ruled that most individuals convicted of nonviolent crimes should remain free until they have exhausted the appeals process. Nevertheless, Lula remains ineligible for elective office unless the convictions are overturned and ultimately may have to serve out the remainder of his sentences.


The inability of Brazil’s political leadership to overcome these crises undermined Brazilians’ confidence in their democratic institutions. As of mid-2018, 33% of Brazilians expressed trust in the judiciary, 26% expressed trust in the election system, 12% expressed trust in congress, 7% expressed trust in the federal government, and 6% expressed trust in political parties. Moreover,

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only 9% of Brazilians expressed satisfaction with the way democracy was working in their country—the lowest percentage in all of Latin America.¹⁶

Bolsonaro Administration (2019-Present)

Brazilian voters registered their intense dissatisfaction with the situation in the country in the 2018 elections. In addition to ousting 75% of incumbents running for reelection to the senate and 43% of incumbents running for reelection to the chamber of deputies, they elected as president, Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman and retired army captain.¹⁷ Prior to the election, most observers considered Bolsonaro to be a fringe figure in the Brazilian congress. He exercised little influence over policy and was best known for his controversial remarks defending the country’s military dictatorship (1964-1985) and expressing prejudice toward marginalized sectors of Brazilian society.¹⁸ Backed by the small Social Liberal Party (PSL), Bolsonaro also lacked the finances and party machinery of his principal competitors. Nevertheless, his social media-driven campaign and populist, tough-on-crime message attracted a strong base of support. He outflanked his opponents by exploiting anti-PT and antiestablishment sentiment and aligning himself with the few institutions that Brazilians still generally trust: the military and the churches.¹⁹ Bolsonaro largely remained off the campaign trail in the weeks leading up to the election after being stabbed in an assassination attempt, but he easily defeated the PT’s Fernando Haddad 55%-45% in a second-round runoff. Bolsonaro’s PSL also won the second-most seats in the lower house.

Since Bolsonaro began his four-year term on January 1, 2019, he has struggled to advance portions of his agenda due to cabinet infighting and the lack of a working majority in Brazil’s fragmented congress, which includes 24 political parties.²⁰ Whereas previous Brazilian presidents stitched governing coalitions together by distributing control of government jobs and resources to parties in exchange for their support, Bolsonaro initially was unwilling to enter into such arrangements. Moreover, he generally has avoided negotiating the details of his policy proposals with legislators. Instead, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and verbally attacking perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other branches of government.²¹ Bolsonaro’s attacks have grown more strident since March 2020, as he has faced widespread scrutiny over his erratic response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and his alleged attempts to interfere in law enforcement investigations to protect his family and allies (see “Pandemic Response” and “Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” below).

Bolsonaro’s confrontational approach to governance and recent scandals have alienated many of his potential allies within the conservative-leaning congress, as well as some former supporters. In November 2019, for example, Bolsonaro abandoned the PSL after a series of disagreements

¹⁹ Matias Spektor, “It’s Not Just the Right That’s Voting for Bolsonaro. It’s Everyone,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2018. As of mid-2018, 58% of Brazilians expressed trust in the military and 73% expressed trust in the churches, according to Corporación Latinobarómetro.
²¹ See, for example, Andres Schipani, “Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro Pushes Culture War over Economic Reform,” Financial Times, August 24, 2019; and Paulo Trevisani, “Brazil’s President Hits the Street, Railing Against the Media,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2020.
with the party’s leadership; he intends to create a new Alliance for Brazil party to contest future elections. In May 2020, Bolsonaro reportedly began distributing government positions to several large patronage-based parties in an attempt to ward off impeachment. Although Bolsonaro appears to have sufficient congressional support to hold onto the presidency for the time being, he still lacks a working majority to advance his policy agenda (see “Economic Policy” and “Security Policy,” below). Public opinion remains polarized, with Brazilians taking to the streets both in opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a poll conducted in late June 2020, 32% of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23% consider it “average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”

Pandemic Response

Brazil’s federal health ministry recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a public health emergency of national importance on February 3, 2020—nearly a month before Brazil confirmed its first coronavirus infection. By mid-March, the Bolsonaro Administration had begun to close Brazil’s international borders and had called on the Brazilian Congress to declare a state of public calamity in order to free up resources to address the pandemic’s health and economic effects.

Since then, however, President Bolsonaro has consistently downplayed the threat posed by COVID-19. He has criticized Brazilian states and municipalities for imposing containment measures and has argued that restrictions on economic activity are more damaging than the virus itself. He has issued several decrees to overturn local restrictions, but these decrees have been blocked in court. Bolsonaro has repeatedly flouted public health guidelines, wading into crowds of supporters without a mask, even as nearly two dozen top officials in his government have tested positive for the virus. Bolsonaro also has clashed with members of his own administration, dismissing one health minister and provoking the resignation of another, due to his opposition to social distancing measures and his promotion of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine—two antimalarial drugs that have yet to be proven effective for treating COVID-19.

To date, Brazil’s efforts to contain the virus have been unsuccessful. As of July 5, 2020, Brazil had recorded more than 1.6 million cases and nearly 65,000 deaths from COVID-19 (see Figure 2). An epidemiological study based on antibody tests suggests the total number of Brazilians who have been infected by the virus may be six times higher than the number of officially confirmed cases. The study also found significant regional, socioeconomic, and ethnic/racial disparities in infection rates. For example, 1.1% of self-identified white Brazilians tested positive for antibodies, compared to 2.1% of Brazilians of Asian descent, 2.5% of black Brazilians, 3.1% of mixed-race Brazilians, and 5.4% of indigenous Brazilians. Although Brazil has one of the strongest public health systems in Latin America, hospitals have been overwhelmed in some

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cities, and the virus is now spreading rapidly throughout the interior of the country.\(^{28}\) The politicization of the pandemic and the lack of coordination among different levels of government may have contributed to the country’s ineffective response.

**Figure 2. Confirmed Cases of COVID-19**
(new cases by date reported [February 26, 2020 – July 5, 2020])


**Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law**

Many analysts argue there has been an erosion of democracy in Brazil under Bolsonaro.\(^{29}\) Since taking office, the president has continued to celebrate Brazil’s military dictatorship, and his sons—who play an influential role in his government—have questioned democracy and suggested authoritarian measures may be necessary in certain circumstances.\(^{30}\) Bolsonaro also has attended rallies in which some of his supporters have called on the military to close congress and the supreme court.\(^{31}\)

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Civil-military relations have shifted as Bolsonaro has appointed retired and active-duty military officers to lead more than a third of his cabinet ministries and to approximately 3,000 other positions throughout the government.\textsuperscript{32} The Brazilian armed forces are now more involved in governance than they have been at any time since the end of the dictatorship. Although some analysts maintain that the officers have had a moderating influence on Bolsonaro, others are concerned about politicization of the armed forces. On several occasions, Bolsonaro and members of his administration have appeared to suggest that the armed forces would back the president if the Brazilian congress or judiciary sought to remove him from office.\textsuperscript{33}

Bolsonaro also has exerted political influence over law enforcement agencies, potentially hindering investigations and calling into question the independence of Brazilian institutions. Minister of Justice and Public Security Sérgio Moro resigned in April 2020 after Bolsonaro dismissed the director-general of the Brazilian federal police, allegedly to push for certain appointments within the force and gain access to confidential information regarding ongoing investigations. Bolsonaro denied the allegations, but his newly appointed director-general immediately replaced the head of the federal police office in Rio de Janeiro, which reportedly is investigating potential corruption and money laundering by two of Bolsonaro’s sons. The federal police also are investigating dozens of Bolsonaro’s political allies—and reportedly at least one of his sons—for their alleged involvement in an illegal digital disinformation campaign.\textsuperscript{34} In addition to his federal police appointments, observers have questioned changes Bolsonaro has made to Brazil’s tax collection agency, financial intelligence unit, and antitrust regulator, as well as his decision to disregard a norm in place since 2003 of selecting an attorney general from a shortlist approved by the public prosecutors’ association.\textsuperscript{35}

Observers have raised serious concerns about human rights in Brazil as Bolsonaro has taken steps to weaken the press, exert control over NGOs, and roll back rights previously granted to marginalized groups.\textsuperscript{36} Brazil’s civil society has pushed back against such measures, many of which have been blocked by the Brazilian congress and judiciary. Nevertheless, human rights advocates argue the president’s statements and actions have fueled attacks against journalists, activists, and indigenous and quilombola communities.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{35} Ryan C. Berg, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Continues to Be His Own Worst Enemy,” American Enterprise Institute, September 24, 2019; and Guilherme France, Brazil: Setbacks in the Legal and Institutional Anti-Corruption Frameworks, Transparency International, 2019.


\textsuperscript{37} Quilombolas are a self-declared ethno-racial group, some of whom are the descendants of freed or escaped slaves. For more information, see Mariana Nozela Prado, “Quilombola Communities of Brazil,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Brazil Institute, infographic, August 13, 2018, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/quilombola-communities-brazil; “Brazil: Journalists Denounce Increased Attacks,” Latin News Daily, January 17, 2020; Maria Elena Bucheli, “Bolsonaro ‘Turned Me into a Pariah,’ Says Gay Lawmaker Who Fled Brazil,” Agence France Presse, March 20, 2019; and “Brazil: Indigenous Violence on the Rise,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, January 2020.
Economic Policy

During its first year in office, the Bolsonaro Administration began implementing key aspects of its market-oriented economic agenda. As part of a far-reaching privatization program, the Brazilian government began selling off assets, including subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises, stakes in private companies, and infrastructure and energy concessions, yielding revenues of approximately $66 billion in 2019. The Brazilian congress also enacted a major pension reform expected to reduce government expenditures by at least $194 billion over the next decade. Those policies built on a 2016 constitutional amendment that froze inflation-adjusted government spending for 20 years. Other Bolsonaro Administration proposals to simplify the tax system, cut and decentralize government expenditures, and decrease compensation and job security for government employees had yet to move forward in congress when legislators shifted their focus to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.

Although the International Monetary Fund had expected Brazil’s economic growth to accelerate from 1.1% in 2019 to 2.2% in 2020, it now forecasts a 9.1% contraction. According to one projection, the unemployment rate, which was already above 12% before the onset of the pandemic, will average nearly 19% over the course of the year. The Brazilian congress has enacted a series of emergency measures to mitigate the economic and social impacts of the recession, including an expansion of a conditional cash transfer program for low-income Brazilians, new monthly cash transfers for informal and unemployed workers, credit and payroll assistance for small- and medium-sized businesses, and aid for state and municipal governments. Altogether, the government’s fiscal response is equivalent to more than 6% of GDP. The Brazilian Central Bank has provided additional support for the economy by cutting the benchmark interest rate to a historic low and implementing measures to increase the liquidity of the financial system.

Bolsonaro Administration officials and some economists assert that Brazil should quickly withdraw the emergency measures and enact pending structural reforms once the economy begins to recover. They argue that reducing Brazil’s fiscal deficit and stabilizing public debt are necessary to attract private investment and foster economic growth. Other economists argue that the pandemic and recession demonstrate the need for a stronger public health system, more comprehensive social safety net, and increased public investment in education, infrastructure, and research and development.

Security Policy

Bolsonaro has had difficulty advancing the hard-line security platform that was the centerpiece of his campaign. The Brazilian congress blocked Bolsonaro’s proposal to shield from prosecution

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41 Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Boletim Macro, June 2020.
police who kill suspected criminals and pushed back against Bolsonaro’s decrees loosening gun controls. Other Bolsonaro Administration proposals, including measures to modernize police investigations and impose stricter criminal sentences, were enacted in December 2019.

Preliminary data suggest that security conditions in Brazil improved in 2019, as the country registered a 19% decline in homicides. The number of individuals killed by police increased, however, including an 18% spike in the state of Rio de Janeiro.\(^{45}\) In recent years, more than 75% of those killed by police have been Afro-Brazilian.\(^{46}\) The Bolsonaro Administration has claimed credit for falling crime rates, but some security analysts argue the situation has been improving since late 2017 due to state and municipal initiatives and reduced conflict between the country’s largest criminal groups.\(^{47}\) (See the “Counternarcotics” section for more information.)

Amazon Conservation and Climate Change

A 30% increase in fires in the Brazilian Amazon in 2019 compared to the previous year led many Brazilians and international observers to express concern about the rainforest and the extent to which its destruction is contributing to regional and global climate change.\(^{48}\) Covering nearly 2.7 million square miles across seven countries, the Amazon Basin is home to the largest and most biodiverse tropical forest in the world.\(^{49}\) Scientific studies have found that the Amazon plays an important role in the global carbon cycle by absorbing and sequestering carbon. Although findings vary, one recent study estimated the forest absorbs 560 million tons of carbon dioxide per year and its biomass holds 76 billion tons of carbon—an amount equivalent to seven years of global carbon emissions.\(^{50}\) The Amazon also pumps water into the atmosphere, affecting regional rainfall patterns throughout South America.\(^{51}\) An estimated 17% of the Amazon basin has been deforested, however, and some scientists have warned that the forest may be nearing a tipping point at which it is no longer able to sustain itself and transitions to a drier, savanna-like ecosystem.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{48}\) Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), “Monitoramento dos Focos Ativos por Bio massa,” at http://queimadas.dgi.inpe.br/queimadas/portal-static/estatisticas_estados/. For more information on the fires, see CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, by Pervaze A. Sheikh et al.

\(^{49}\) Portions of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Venezuela are located in the Amazon Basin. The rainforest extends beyond the Amazon Basin into Suriname and French Guiana. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global International Waters Assessment: Amazon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Kalmar, Sweden, 2004, p. 15.


Efforts to conserve the forest often focus on Brazil, since the country encompasses about 69% of the Amazon Basin.53 Within Brazil, the government has established an administrative zone known as the Legal Amazon, which includes nine states: Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins, and most of Maranhão (see Figure 1). Although rainforest covers most of the Legal Amazon, savanna (Cerrado) and wetlands (Pantanal) are present in portions of the region. The Legal Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military-led government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of national security. Partially due to those incentives, the human population in the Legal Amazon grew from 6 million in 1960 to 25 million in 2010. Forest cover in the Legal Amazon has declined by approximately 20% as settlements, roads, logging, ranching, farming, and other activities have proliferated in the region.54

**Brazilian Policies and Deforestation Trends**

In 2004, the Brazilian government adopted an action plan to prevent and control deforestation in the Legal Amazon.55 It increased surveillance in the Amazon region, began to enforce environmental laws and regulations more rigorously, and took steps to consolidate and expand protected lands. Nearly 20% of the Brazilian Amazon now has some sort of federal or state protected status, and the Brazilian government has recognized an additional 22% of the Brazilian Amazon as indigenous territories.56 Brazil’s forest code also requires private landowners in the Legal Amazon to maintain native vegetation on 80% of their properties.

Other Brazilian initiatives have sought to support sustainable development in the Amazon while limiting the extent to which the country’s agricultural sector drives deforestation. In 2008, the Brazilian government began conditioning credit on farmers’ compliance with environmental laws; in 2009, the government banned new sugarcane plantations in the Legal Amazon. The Brazilian government also supported private sector conservation initiatives. Those included a 2006 voluntary agreement among most major soybean traders not to purchase soybeans grown on lands deforested after 2006 (later revised to 2008) and a 2009 voluntary agreement among meatpackers not to purchase cattle raised on lands deforested in the Amazon after 2008.

Brazil’s public and private conservation efforts, combined with economic factors that made agricultural commodity exports less profitable,57 led to an 83% decline in deforestation in the Legal Amazon between 2004 and 2012. Deforestation has been trending upward in recent years, however, rising from a low of 1,765 square miles in 2012 to 3,911 square miles in the 12-month monitoring period that ended in July 2019 (see Figure 3). Analysts have linked the increase in deforestation to a series of policy reversals that have cut funding for environmental enforcement, reduced the size of protected areas, and relaxed conservation requirements.58 Market incentives,

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such as the growth in Chinese imports of Brazilian beef and soybeans, also have contributed to recent deforestation trends.\textsuperscript{59} For example, China purchased nearly 76\% of its soybean imports from Brazil in 2018, up from roughly 50\% in prior years, after imposing a retaliatory tariff on U.S. soybeans.\textsuperscript{60}

**Figure 3. Deforestation in Brazil’s Legal Amazon: 2004-2019**

![Figure 3](image)


*Notes:* Annual monitoring periods run from August to July (e.g., 2019 data include deforestation from August 2018 to July 2019).

Although changes that weakened Brazil’s environmental policies began under President Rousseff and continued under President Temer, some analysts argue that the Bolsonaro Administration’s approach to the Amazon has led to further increases in deforestation.\textsuperscript{61} Bolsonaro has fiercely defended Brazil’s sovereignty over the Legal Amazon and its right to develop the region. Since taking office, his administration has lifted the ban on new sugarcane plantations in the Legal Amazon and called for an end to the soy moratorium. It also has proposed measures to provide property titles to individuals illegally occupying public lands and to allow commercial agriculture, mining, and hydroelectric projects in indigenous territories. The Bolsonaro


\textsuperscript{61} Kathryn Hochstetler, “This Isn’t the First Time Fires Have Ravaged the Amazon,” *Foreign Policy*, August 29, 2019; and Rubens Ricupero et al., *Comunicado dos Ex-Ministros de Estado do Meio Ambiente*, May 8, 2019.
Administration argues that such economic activities will benefit those living in the region and reduce incentives for illegal deforestation.

At the same time, Bolsonaro has questioned the Brazilian government’s deforestation data and scaled back environmental enforcement. He has removed several high-level officials from Brazil’s environmental monitoring and enforcement agencies, replacing them with appointees who allegedly have hampered enforcement efforts. In 2019, Brazil’s primary environmental enforcement agency reportedly issued 34% fewer environmental fines, reported 51% fewer environmental crimes, and seized 61% less illegally logged timber than it had in 2018.

Those actions reportedly have emboldened some loggers, miners, and ranchers, contributing to the surge in fires in 2019 and a 34% increase in deforestation in the annual monitoring period that included the first seven months of Bolsonaro’s term. Bolsonaro initially dismissed environmental concerns about the Amazon, asserting that deforestation and burning are cultural practices that will never end. In January 2020, however, he announced the creation of a new security force to protect the environment and a new Amazon Council, headed by Vice President Hamilton Mourão, to coordinate conservation and sustainable development efforts. About 4,000 troops, police officers, and environmental agents have been deployed in the Amazon region as part of an inter-agency enforcement operation since May 2020. The Bolsonaro Administration is also reportedly drafting a new plan for combatting illegal deforestation.

Paris Agreement

The rising levels of Amazon deforestation call into question whether Brazil will meet its Paris Agreement commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 37% below 2005 levels (to 1.3 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO₂e) by 2025. According to a 2018 assessment by the U.N. Environment Program, Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions declined by 12% per year from 2006 to 2016, as significant declines in deforestation offset slight increases in emissions from other sources. Those reductions had put Brazil on track to meet its Paris Agreement commitment, but emissions have begun to rise again due to increased deforestation. In 2018,
Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions increased by an estimated 0.3% (to 1.9 GtCO₂e), even as emissions from the energy sector declined by nearly 5%.⁶⁹

President Bolsonaro had pledged to withdraw from the Paris Agreement during his 2018 election campaign, but he reversed course following his inauguration, stating that Brazil would remain in the agreement “for now.”⁷⁰ At the 25th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 25), Brazil pushed developed countries to meet their 2009 goal to mobilize $100 billion from public and private sources, annually, by 2020, to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. Brazil’s environmental minister has asserted that Brazil should receive at least 10% of those funds.⁷¹ Brazil also insisted that carbon credits developed under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol should carry over into the Paris Agreement’s new international carbon markets and that countries that host emissions-cutting projects should not have to report the transfers of those credits to other countries. Many other negotiators expressed concern that Brazil’s proposals could allow poorly validated credits from the Kyoto mechanisms to undermine the new Paris Agreement markets, as well as risk double-counting the credits both internationally and toward the host countries’ domestic mitigation goals. Those disagreements reportedly impeded efforts to finalize rules for new carbon markets under the Paris Agreement.⁷²

Even as the Brazilian government has called for greater international financial support, it has deprioritized domestic efforts to combat climate change. In 2019, the Bolsonaro Administration closed the climate change departments within the environment and foreign ministries and reduced spending on climate change initiatives by about 10% compared to 2018. Brazil’s 2020 federal budget authorizes 37% less funding for climate change initiatives than was expended in 2019.⁷³ Moreover, the Bolsonaro Administration lost one of Brazil’s primary sources of international assistance when it unilaterally restructured the governance of the Amazon Fund—a mechanism launched in 2008 to attract funding for conservation and sustainable development efforts. In response, the governments of Norway and Germany, which have donated nearly $1.3 billion to the fund since 2009, suspended their contributions in August 2019.⁷⁴ Vice President Hamilton Mourão and state governments in the Legal Amazon are negotiating with Norway and Germany to restore the funding.

U.S.-Brazilian Relations

The United States and Brazil historically have enjoyed robust political and economic relations, but the countries’ divergent perceptions of their national interests have inhibited the development of a close partnership. Those perceptions have changed somewhat over the past year and a half. Whereas the past several Brazilian administrations sought to maintain autonomy in foreign affairs, Bolsonaro has called for close alignment with the United States. Within Latin America, for example, the Bolsonaro Administration has adopted a more confrontational approach toward

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Cuba and has closely coordinated with the Trump Administration on measures to address the crisis in Venezuela. The Trump Administration has welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement, designating Brazil as a major non-NATO ally and concluding several small-scale bilateral commercial agreements in 2019. The Trump Administration also has sought to support Brazil’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, providing the country with more than $12.5 million of health and humanitarian assistance and—more controversially—2 million doses of hydroxychloroquine.\(^\text{75}\)

Bolsonaro’s realignment of Brazilian foreign policy has been contentious domestically. Some analysts argue that it has not resulted in many concrete benefits for Brazil.\(^\text{76}\) They note, for example, that the Trump Administration has maintained, and threatened to impose, trade barriers on key Brazilian exports despite recent bilateral agreements (see “Recent Trade Negotiations”). Likewise, U.S. officials reportedly have warned Brazil that closer bilateral defense ties could be in jeopardy if Brazil allows Chinese telecommunications company Huawei to participate in Brazil’s 5G cellular network (see the “Defense Cooperation” section). Some Brazilian analysts also argue that abandoning the country’s commitment to autonomy in foreign affairs has weakened Brazil’s international standing and caused tensions in its relations with other important partners, such as fellow members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) group.\(^\text{77}\) There does not appear to be public support for the Trump Administration’s foreign policy within Brazil; in 2019, 60% of Brazilians expressed no confidence in President Trump to “do the right thing regarding world affairs.”\(^\text{78}\)

In some cases, domestic opposition has prevented Bolsonaro from aligning Brazilian foreign policy more closely with the United States. For example, during his 2018 presidential campaign, Bolsonaro indicated he would follow President Trump’s lead in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on climate change and taking a more confrontational approach toward Chinese trade and investment. He has backed away from those positions since taking office, reportedly due to concerns about losing access to foreign markets, particularly within the powerful agribusiness sector, which accounts for 21% of Brazil’s GDP and is a major component of Bolsonaro’s political base.\(^\text{79}\)

Although some Members of the 116th Congress have urged the Trump Administration to seize on Bolsonaro’s goodwill to develop a strategic partnership with Brazil, others have expressed reservations about the current Brazilian administration. They are concerned about Bolsonaro’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as about changes to Brazil’s environmental policies that appear to have contributed to fires and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (see “U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation”).


\(^{76}\) Terrence McCoy, “In Brazil, Trump Tariffs Show Bolsonaro’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Has Backfired,”\(^\text{Washington Post}\), December 2, 2019; and Oliver Stuenkel, “Bolsonaro Placed a Losing Bet on Trump,”\(^\text{Foreign Policy}\), December 6, 2019.


\(^{79}\) Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada, \(^\text{PIB do Agronegócio Brasil}\), 2020; Oliver Stuenkel, “Bolsonaro Fans the Flames,”\(^\text{ Foreign Affairs}\), August 30, 2019; and “No 1º Ano de Bolsonaro, China Vai de Ameaça Comunista a Aliada Estratégica,” \(^\text{ Folha de São Paulo}\), January 1, 2020.
Commercial Relations

Trade policy often has been a contentious issue in U.S.-Brazilian relations. Since the early 1990s, Brazil’s trade policy has prioritized integration with its South American neighbors through the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Brazil is the industrial hub of Mercosur, which it established in 1991 with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the bloc was intended to advance incrementally toward full economic integration, only a limited customs union has been achieved thus far. Mercosur also has evolved into a somewhat protectionist arrangement, shielding its members from external competition rather than serving as a platform for insertion into the global economy, as originally envisioned. Within the WTO, Brazil traditionally has joined with other developing nations to push the United States and other developed countries to reduce their agricultural tariffs and subsidies while resisting developed countries’ calls for increased access to developing countries’ industrial and services sectors. Those differences blocked conclusion of the most recent round of multilateral trade negotiations (the WTO’s Doha Round), as well as U.S. efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to establish a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas.

Recent Trade Negotiations

The Bolsonaro and Trump Administrations have negotiated several agreements intended to strengthen the bilateral commercial relationship. During Bolsonaro’s March 2019 official visit to Washington, the United States and Brazil agreed to take steps toward lowering trade barriers for certain agricultural products. Brazil agreed to adopt a tariff rate quota—implemented in November 2019—to allow the importation of 750,000 tons of U.S. wheat annually without tariffs. Brazil also agreed to adopt “science-based conditions” that could enable imports of U.S. pork. In exchange, the United States agreed to send a U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) team to Brazil to audit the country’s raw beef inspection system.

The United States had suspended imports of raw beef from Brazil in June 2017, after Brazilian investigators discovered that some of the country’s top meat processing companies, including JBS and BRF, had bribed food inspectors to approve the sale of tainted products. FSIS began inspecting all meat products arriving from Brazil and refused entry to 11% of Brazilian fresh beef products in the months leading up to the suspension. The Bolsonaro Administration had hoped an FSIS audit would quickly reopen the U.S. market to Brazilian beef and expressed frustration that U.S. import restrictions remained in place through the end of 2019. On February 21, 2020, however, the Trump Administration lifted the suspension after determining that “Brazil’s food safety inspection system governing raw intact beef is equivalent to that of the United States.” Nevertheless, some consumer advocates, industry groups, and Members of Congress remain concerned about Brazilian meat. A bill introduced in April 2019 (S. 1124, Tester) would suspend

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80 Joao Augusto de Castro Neves, Brazil’s Slow and Uncertain Shift from Protectionism to Free Trade, Inter-American Dialogue, working paper, January 2014.
81 For background on the stalled negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F. Fefer, and Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS Report RL33162, Trade Integration in the Americas, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
all beef and poultry imports from Brazil while a working group evaluates the extent to which those imports pose a threat to food safety.

The United States and Brazil announced several other agreements during Bolsonaro’s March 2019 official visit. A technology safeguards agreement, which the Brazilian congress ratified in November 2019, will enable the launch of U.S.-licensed satellites from Alcântara space center in Brazil’s northeastern state of Maranhão. The United States also endorsed Brazil’s accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in exchange for Brazil agreeing to gradually give up its “special and differential treatment” status, which grants special rights to developing nations at the WTO.

In 2020, U.S. and Brazilian officials reportedly hope to conclude agreements on customs administration, e-commerce rules, regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures while consulting with domestic stakeholders regarding “how best to expand trade and develop the bilateral economic relationship.”85 U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer asserts that the Trump Administration does not have any plans to pursue a comprehensive free-trade agreement with Brazil at this time but is negotiating small-scale accords to address challenges faced by U.S. businesses.86 A majority of Members on the House Committee on Ways and Means signed a letter in June 2020 expressing strong opposition to “pursuing any type of trade agreement with the Bolsonaro government” due to human rights, labor, and environmental concerns.87

<table>
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<th>Potential U.S. Tariffs on Brazilian Steel</th>
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| In December 2019, President Trump announced his intention to impose tariffs on steel imports from Brazil. The Trump Administration had imposed a 25% tariff on selected steel imports from most countries in March 2018, using the authority granted in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to take action to adjust imports that threaten to impair U.S. national security (19 U.S.C. §1862). The Administration ended up excluding Brazil from those additional duties after the Brazilian government agreed to a quota allotment that restricts the total amount of steel Brazil can export to the United States. In his December 2019 tweet announcing the tariffs, President Trump asserted that Brazil had presided over “a massive devaluation” of its currency, “which is not good for [U.S.] farmers.” Economists maintain that the Brazilian real has lost value compared to the U.S. dollar due to the comparative weakness of the Brazilian economy, not manipulation by Brazil’s central bank. The Trump Administration’s trade dispute with China also has led to increased Chinese purchases of Brazilian soy and other agricultural commodities. The Trump Administration has yet to impose tariffs on Brazilian steel, but President Trump has refused to rule out doing so in the future.

For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones.


In addition to congressional opposition, a potential free-trade agreement would need to overcome a series of other challenges. Barring changes to Mercosur’s rules, any agreement to reduce tariffs would need to be negotiated with the broader bloc. In 2019, Mercosur signed free-trade

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agreements with the European Union and the European Free Trade Association. Those agreements have yet to be ratified, however, and the recent political shift in Argentina could make the negotiation of new agreements more difficult. An free-trade agreement also could provoke opposition from domestic producers threatened by foreign competition. Industry associations in Brazil reportedly have been lobbying the Bolsonaro Administration to focus on reducing costs for domestic business before pursuing trade liberalization. U.S. businesses also have sought protections, and President Trump has occasionally threatened to impose tariffs on Brazilian products (see the text box, above).

**Trade and Investment Flows**

U.S.-Brazilian trade has increased significantly over the past two decades but has suffered from economic volatility, such as the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and Brazil’s 2014-2017 recession (see Figure 4). In 2019, total bilateral merchandise trade amounted to $73.9 billion. U.S. goods exports to Brazil totaled $43.1 billion, and U.S. goods imports from Brazil totaled $30.9 billion, giving the United States a $12.2 billion trade surplus. The top U.S. exports to Brazil were mineral fuels, aircraft, machinery, and organic chemicals. The top U.S. imports from Brazil included mineral fuels, iron and steel, aircraft, machinery, and wood and wood pulp. In 2019, Brazil was the 14th-largest trading partner of the United States. The United States was Brazil’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 14.8% of Brazil’s total merchandise trade, compared to 24.4% for China.

Brazil benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences program, which provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing countries. Brazil was the fourth-largest beneficiary of the program in 2019, with duty-free imports to the United States valued at $2.3 billion—equivalent to 7.4% of all U.S. merchandise imports from Brazil.

U.S.-Brazilian services trade is also significant. In 2018 (the most recent year for which data are available), total bilateral services trade amounted to $34.4 billion. U.S. services exports to Brazil totaled $28.2 billion, and U.S. services imports from Brazil totaled $6.1 billion, giving the United States a $22.1 billion surplus. Travel, transport, and telecommunications were the top categories of U.S. services exports to Brazil, and business services was the top category of U.S. imports from Brazil. Brazil began exempting U.S. citizens from the country’s tourist and business visa requirements in June 2019, which could increase U.S. travel to Brazil in the coming years. In 2019, more than 2.1 million Brazilians visited the United States, spending $11.3 billion on travel and tourism. Due to widespread person-to-person transmission of the novel coronavirus in

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88 For more information on Argentina, see CRS In Focus IF10932, *Argentina: An Overview*, by Mark P. Sullivan.


91 Brazilian Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX) data, as made available by *Global Trade Atlas*, February 2020.


Brazil, however, the United States has denied entry to most Brazilian citizens and other foreign nationals who have been present in Brazil in the previous 14 days since May 28, 2020.95

**Figure 4. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2008-2019**

![Graph showing U.S. trade with Brazil from 2008 to 2019](image)

**Source:** CRS presentation of U.S. Department of Commerce data, as made available through Global Trade Atlas and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, accessed February 2020.

**Note:** Services data are not yet available for 2019.

U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil has increased by more than 60% since 2008. As of 2018 (the most recent year for which data are available), the accumulated stock of U.S. FDI in Brazil was $70.9 billion, with significant investments in manufacturing, finance, and mining, among other sectors.96

**Security Cooperation**

Although U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on security issues traditionally has been limited, law enforcement and military ties have grown closer in recent years. In 2018, the countries launched a new Permanent Forum on Security that aims to foster “strategic, intense, on-going bilateral cooperation” on a range of security challenges, including arms and drug trafficking, cybercrime, financial crimes, and terrorism.97 The United States and Brazil also engage in high-level security discussions under the long-standing Political-Military Dialogue and a new Strategic Partnership Dialogue, which met for the first time in September 2019.

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Counternarcotics

Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, but it is the world’s second-largest consumer of cocaine hydrochloride and likely the world’s largest consumer of cocaine-derivative products. It is also a major transit country for cocaine bound for Europe. Organized crime in Brazil has increased in scope and scale over the past decade, as some of the country’s large, well-organized, and heavily armed criminal groups—such as the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, or CV) and the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC)—have increased their transnational operations. Security analysts have attributed much of the recent violence in Brazil, particularly in the northern portion of the country, to clashes among the CV, PCC, and their local affiliates over control of strategic trafficking corridors.

The Brazilian government has responded to the challenges posed by organized crime by bolstering security along the 9,767-mile border it shares with 10 nations, including the region’s cocaine producers—Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Under its Strategic Border Plan, introduced in 2011, the Brazilian government has deployed interagency resources, including unmanned aerial vehicles, to monitor illicit activity in high-risk locations along its borders and in the remote Amazon region. It also has carried out joint operations with neighboring countries. More recently, the Brazilian government has begun acquiring low-altitude mobile radars and other equipment to support its Integrated Border Monitoring System. That system was initially scheduled to be operational along the entire Brazilian border in 2022, but the Brazilian government now estimates that the system may not be completely in place until 2035 due to budget constraints.

The United States supports counternarcotics capacity-building efforts in Brazil under a 2008 U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. In 2019, the United States trained nearly 1,000 Brazilian police officers on combatting money laundering and community policing, among other topics.

Counterterrorism

Despite having little history of terrorism, Brazil began working closely with the United States and other international partners to assess and mitigate potential terrorist threats in the lead-up to hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Among other support, U.S. authorities trained Brazilian law enforcement on topics such as countering international terrorism, preventing attacks on soft targets, and identifying fraudulent documents. The Brazilian government also enacted legislation that criminalized terrorism and terrorist financing in 2016, closing a long-standing legal gap that reportedly had hindered counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions. Brazil further strengthened its legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets in 2019 to address deficiencies identified by the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force.


99 See, for example, Bruno Paes Manso, “A Cena Criminal Brasileira Mudou; Compreendê-la Ajuda Entender as Novas Dinâmicas do Homicídio,” in Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2019 (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2019); and Carolina Sampó, De la Reclusión en las Prisiones al Trafico de Cocaína: la Evolución de las Organizaciones Criminales Brasileñas, Real Instituto Elcano, working paper, June 10, 2019.


101 INCSR, 2020, p. 111.


Brazilian officials have used the new legal framework several times in recent years. In the weeks leading up to the 2016 Olympics, they dismantled a loose, online network of Islamic State sympathizers; 12 individuals were detained, and 8 ultimately were convicted and sentenced to between 5 and 15 years in prison for promoting the Islamic State and terrorist attacks through social media. In 2018, Brazilian prosecutors charged 11 individuals with planning to establish an Islamic State cell in Brazil and attempting to recruit fighters to send to Syria. Although some observers have applauded such efforts, others argue that Brazilian authorities are improperly surveilling, and stoking prejudice toward, the country’s small Muslim population.

Brazil historically had been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation due to concerns about criminalizing the activities of social movements and other groups that engage in actions of political dissent. President Bolsonaro has reinvigorated those concerns by labeling protestors and Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, or MST) as terrorists. In December 2019, the Brazilian congress restricted the ability of the country’s financial intelligence unit to report on terrorist financing, reportedly to prevent Bolsonaro from targeting political and social activists. That restriction could jeopardize Brazil’s compliance with global anti-money laundering and antiterrorism financing standards.

In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State allocated $700,000 of FY2019 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs aid to Brazil to improve Brazilian law enforcement’s capability to deter, detect, and respond to terrorism-related activities. The assistance will fund border security training and other initiatives, with a particular focus on preventing suspected terrorists and terrorist facilitators from transiting the so-called Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, which has long been a haven for illicit activities. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers also are working with Brazilian authorities at Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo to identify high-risk travelers and contraband moving through Brazil.

**Defense Cooperation**

U.S.-Brazilian military ties have grown considerably over the past decade but have faced occasional setbacks. In the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, U.S. and

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110 In September 2018, for example, Brazilian police arrested an alleged Hezbollah financier in the Tri-Border Area who the U.S. Department of the Treasury had previously sanctioned as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Brazil does not consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization, but the Bolsonaro Administration reportedly is considering measures to designate it as such.

Brazilian military forces providing humanitarian assistance engaged in their largest combined operations since World War II. Later in 2010, the countries signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement and a General Security of Military Information Agreement intended to facilitate the sharing of classified information. The Brazilian congress did not approve those agreements until 2015, however, due to a cooling of relations after press reports revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency had engaged in extensive espionage in Brazil. A Master Information Exchange Agreement, signed in 2017, implemented the two previous agreements and enabled the countries to pursue bilateral defense-related technology projects.

In July 2019, President Trump designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally for the purposes of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). Among other benefits, that designation offers Brazil privileged access to the U.S. defense industry and increased joint military exchanges, exercises, and training. In FY2019, the U.S. government provided $666,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to Brazil to strengthen military-to-military relationships, increase the professionalization of Brazilian forces, and enhance the Brazilian military’s capabilities. The U.S. government also delivered to Brazil $11.2 million of equipment under the Excess Defense Articles program and $96.7 million of equipment and services under the Foreign Military Sales program. The U.S. government is providing an estimated $800,000 of IMET to Brazil in FY2020, and the Trump Administration has requested $623,000 of IMET for Brazil in FY2021.

Although recent bilateral agreements and the U.S. designation of Brazil as a major non-NATO ally have laid a foundation for closer military ties, the long-term trajectory of the defense relationship may depend on broader geopolitical considerations. For example, U.S. officials reportedly have warned that bilateral military and intelligence cooperation could be in jeopardy if Brazil allows the Chinese company Huawei to participate in Brazil’s 5G cellular network. The U.S. government reportedly is offering financing through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation for Brazilian telecommunications companies to purchase 5G equipment from other providers, such as Sweden’s Ericsson or Finland’s Nokia. Some Brazilian officials are concerned, however, that excluding Huawei could delay the technology’s rollout and make it more expensive for consumers. More broadly, the Bolsonaro Administration generally has sought to avoid confrontations with China—Brazil’s top trade partner and an important source of foreign investment—and influential sectors of Brazil’s military and foreign policy establishments are wary of becoming embroiled in global power rivalries.

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112 Brazil was the only Latin American nation to deploy forces to Europe during World War II. The 25,000-strong Brazilian Expeditionary Force fought as a division within the United States Fifth Army in Italy.


116 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data provided to CRS, June 15, 2020; and Congressional Budget Justification for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2021, February 10, 2020, p. 132.


Congress has expressed interest in ensuring that U.S. military engagement with Brazil does not contribute to human rights abuses. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. The report is to assess the capabilities of Brazil’s military forces and describe the U.S. security cooperation relationship with Brazil, including U.S. objectives, ongoing or planned activities, and the Brazilian military capabilities that U.S. cooperation could enhance. The report is also to assess the human rights climate in Brazil, including the Brazilian military’s adherence to human rights and an identification of any Brazilian military or security forces credibly alleged to have engaged in human rights violations that have received or purchased U.S. equipment or training. Moreover, the report is to describe ongoing or planned U.S. cooperation activities with Brazil focused on human rights and the extent to which U.S. security cooperation with Brazil could encourage accountability and promote reform through training on human rights, rule of law, and rules of engagement.

Some Members of Congress also have called for changes to U.S. security cooperation with Brazil. A resolution introduced in September 2019 expressing concerns about threats to human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and the environment in Brazil (H.Res. 594, Grijalva) would call for the United States to rescind Brazil’s designation as a major non-NATO ally and suspend assistance to Brazilian security forces, among other actions. In contrast, other Members have called for closer U.S. security ties with Brazil, including its inclusion in NATO partnership programs.120

**U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation**

The U.S. government has supported conservation efforts in Brazil since the 1980s. Current U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities are coordinated through the U.S.-Brazil Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity (PCAB). Launched in 2014, the PCAB brings together the U.S. and Brazilian governments, private sector companies, and NGOs to strengthen protected area management and promote sustainable development in the Amazon. In addition to providing assistance for federally and state-managed protected areas, USAID works with indigenous and quilombola communities to strengthen their capacities to manage their resources and improve their livelihoods. USAID also supports the private sector-led Partnership Platform for the Amazon, which facilitates private investment in innovative conservation and sustainable development activities.121 In November 2019, USAID helped establish the Athelia Biodiversity Fund, a Brazilian equity fund that aims to raise $100 million of mostly private capital to invest in similar efforts. In addition to those long-term development programs, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance deployed a team of wildfire experts to assist Brazilian fire investigators in 2019.

Several other U.S. agencies are engaged in Brazil, often in collaboration with or with funding transferred from USAID. The U.S. Forest Service, for example, provides technical assistance to the Brazilian government, NGOs, and cooperatives intended to improve protected area management, reduce the threat of fire, conserve migratory bird habitat, and facilitate the

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120 Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. Trump, December 20, 2019.

establishment of sustainable value chains for forest products. NASA also has provided data and
technical support to Brazil to help the country better monitor Amazon deforestation.

President Trump has not requested funding for environmental programs in Brazil in any of his
budget proposals. Nevertheless, Congress has continued to fund conservation activities in the
country. In the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), Congress
appropriated $15 million for the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 million to address fires in the
region.

Some Members of Congress have called on the Brazilian and U.S. governments to do more to
conserve the Amazon. For example, a resolution introduced in the Senate in September 2019
(S.Res. 337, Schatz) would express bipartisan concern about fires and illegal deforestation in the
Amazon, call on the Brazilian government to strengthen environmental enforcement and reinstate
protections for indigenous communities, and back continued U.S. assistance to the Brazilian
government and NGOs. The Act for the Amazon Act (H.R. 4263, DeFazio), introduced in
September 2019, would take a more punitive approach. It would ban the importation of certain
fossil fuels and agricultural products from Brazil, prohibit certain types of military-to-military
engagement and security assistance to Brazil, and forbid U.S. agencies from entering into free
trade negotiations with Brazil.

Outlook

More than five years after the country fell into recession and more than three years after the
controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Rousseff, Brazil remains mired
in difficult domestic circumstances. The COVID-19 pandemic abruptly halted the country’s slow
economic recovery and now threatens to wipe out the modest employment gains achieved since
the last downturn. Repeated budget cuts have reduced social services for the most vulnerable and
have weakened the Brazilian government’s capacity to respond to the pandemic and other
challenges, such as high levels of crime and increasing deforestation. President Bolsonaro was
elected, in part, on his pledge to clean up the political system, but his interference in justice sector
agencies and frequent attacks on the press, civil society groups, and other branches of government
have placed additional stress on the country’s already-strained democratic institutions. Brazilian
policymakers are likely to remain focused on these internal challenges for the next several years,
limiting Brazil’s ability to take on regional responsibilities or exert its influence internationally.

U.S.-Brazilian relations have grown closer since 2019, as President Bolsonaro’s foreign policy
has prioritized alignment with the Trump Administration. In addition to coordinating on
international affairs, the U.S. and Brazilian governments have taken steps to bolster commercial
ties and enhance security cooperation. Nonetheless, policy differences have emerged over
sensitive issues, such as bilateral trade barriers and relations with China, which affect the
economic and geopolitical interests of both countries. Those disagreements suggest the Trump
and Bolsonaro Administrations may need to engage in more extensive consultations and
confidence-building measures if they intend to avoid the historic pattern of U.S.-Brazilian
relations, in which heightened expectations give way to mutual disappointment and mistrust.

The 116th Congress may continue to shape U.S.-Brazilian relations using its legislative and
oversight powers. Although there appears to be considerable support in Congress for forging a
long-term strategic partnership with Brazil, many Members may be reluctant to advance major
bilateral commercial or security cooperation initiatives in the near term, given their concerns
about the erosion of democracy, human rights, and environmental protections under Bolsonaro.
For the time being, Congress may continue appropriating funding for programs with broad
support, such as Amazon conservation efforts, while Members continue to advocate for divergent policy approaches toward the Bolsonaro Administration.

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